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INVESTIGATING NETWORK KNOWLEDGE 1
1. Introduction
One of the most prevalent assumptions in the network economics literature is that decision
makers have correct, complete, and common knowledge about the structure of the networks
they interact on. For instance, various models of social learning over networks (Banerjee,
1992; Smith and Sørensen, 2000; Mossel, Sly, and Tamuz, 2015), the literature on network
games of strategic complementarities (Ballester, Calvo´-Armengol, and Zenou, 2006; Calvo´-
Armengol, Patacchini, and Zenou, 2009; Candogan, Bimpikis, and Ozdaglar, 2012), as well
as the growing literature on the econometrics of network formation (Sheng, 2016; Leung,
2015a; Menzel, 2017; de Paula, Richards-Shubik, and Tamer, 2018) implicitly or explicitly
assume that agents have full knowledge about the underlying network structure.
In this paper, we assess the empirical content and theoretical implications of this as-
sumption. Using observational data, we document substantial departures from full network
knowledge, underscoring that the assumption of complete network information may serve
as a poor approximation to the real world. We then investigate the theoretical implications
of relaxing this assumption in each of the three different domains mentioned above — so-
cial learning, network games, and estimation of models of network formation. Our results
illustrate that, while a sensible first step, this assumption is not innocuous: violations of
full network knowledge may have qualitatively and quantitatively important implications
for the predictions of each of these models.
Our empirical investigation uses data collected in 75 villages in Karnataka, India, where
we have previously collected detailed network data across all 16,500+ households (Banerjee
et al., 2016). Our network data consists of information on whether or not a link exists
across a number of informational, financial, and social dimensions for over 98% of pairs
of households in each village. Against this backdrop, we returned to the 75 villages and
asked 4,554 respondents about existence of various forms of linkages between five pairs of
individuals from their village. In particular, we first asked the respondents whether they
are unable to offer a response — either because they are not certain enough or because they
do not know at least one of the individuals in the corresponding pair. If the respondents
were able to offer an answer, we then solicited their guess about the link’s existence.
As our main empirical finding, we document a substantial lack of knowledge about the
network structure, both in terms of respondents’ uncertainty as well as the extent to which
they correctly identified the presence or absence of links in the underlying network.
Consistent with a basic lack of network knowledge, we find that almost half (46%) of
respondents reported that they “don’t know” the link status between a given pair (j, k) of
individuals in their village. We then regressed the dummy variable capturing respondent’s
uncertainty regarding the link on the respondent’s distance to j and k, controlling for the
respondent’s eigenvector centrality, the average centrality of j and k, and a number of
demographic controls (such as caste, amenities, geography). We find that respondents are
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more likely to express uncertainty about the existence of a link between j and k the further
they are in the network: a one-step increase in the average distance of j and k to the
respondent is associated with a 12.2 percentage point (pp) increase (p=0) in the probability
of expressing uncertainty. This effect is sizable, specially relative to the mean of 46%.
We then investigate the quality of the respondents’ information by regressing whether
the respondent correctly identifies the link status of a given pair (j, k) on network distance,
while controlling for centralities and demographic covariates. We find that the quality of the
respondent’s information also declines steeply in social distance: a one-step increase in the
average distance of j and k to the respondent is associated with a 9.3pp decline (p=0) in the
respondent’s probability of correctly identifying that j and k are linked in the underlying
network. This also captures a sizable effect, especially given that the mean rate of correctly
identifying a link’s status is only 20%.1 Even conditional on expressing certainty, we find
that being one step further is associated with a 1.1pp to 2.1pp decline (p=0.005) in the
probability of correctly identifying that j and k are linked.
The bulk of the aforementioned results are not explained by other demographic covariates.
We include geographic distance between respondents and jk pairs, dummies for whether
the respondent is of the same caste or subcaste, has the same household amenities (e.g.,
electrification, roof type, ownership) as j and k, interactions of all of these covariates with
actual jk link status, as well as village fixed effects and even respondent fixed effects. Across
specifications, our conclusions are predominantly unchanged both qualitatively and quan-
titatively. We then conduct a post-LASSO exercise to determine a sparse set of covariates
that predict our key outcomes, namely, the respondent’s correct assessment of link status as
well as her claim whether to know or not know the status of a given link. Both in terms of
correct assessments and degree of certainty, we find that it is the average network distance
to j and k that is selected (along with respondent centrality and the average centrality of
j and k). In contrast, except for caste and subcaste, all other demographic variables —
including geographic distance between the respondent and jk — are not selected. This
finding is consistent with a story where agents learn about the structure of the network
through interactions on and through the network, where knowledge tends to be localized.
We next turn to the theoretical implications of our empirical findings by showing that
relaxing the widespread assumption that the network structure is commonly known can
have first-order implications for a range of qualitative and quantitative results in various
contexts. As a first application, we focus on a simple model of Bayesian learning over social
networks. We show that partial network knowledge may lead to identification problems that
can impede learning, even though information would have been efficiently aggregated had
individuals faced no uncertainty about the network structure. This rests on the observation
that knowledge about the intricate details of the network structure provides the agents with
1This indicates systematic misspecification: respondents are more likely than not to think a link exists. A
back-of-the envelope calculation shows that they must be overestimating the average degree by at least 38%.
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valuable information on how to discern the correlations and redundancies in their neighbors’
estimates. Our result thus demonstrates that predictions about learning dynamics may be
sensitive to the extent and nature of agents’ knowledge about the social network structure.
As a second case study, we illustrate how assuming full network knowledge may lead
to biased structural estimates if in fact decision makers face some uncertainty about the
underlying network. We focus on the canonical network interaction game of Ballester et al.
(2006) with strategic complementarities. This game, which serves as one of the workhorse
models for studying strategic network interactions in the literature, allows for simple struc-
tural estimates, counterfactuals, and policy prescriptions. We show that uncertainty about
the extent of strategic complementarities outside one’s neighborhood results in a system-
atic shift in equilibrium actions (relative to the complete information benchmark). Hence,
ignoring the possibility of incomplete network knowledge may lead to biased structural
estimates for the degree of complementarities, mis-specified cost-benefit analyses, and po-
tentially counterproductive intervention policies (such as identifying “key players” to target
for interventions).
Finally, we shift our attention to investigating the implications of network knowledge for
parameter identification in network formation games. We study a fairly standard economet-
ric model of network formation, where the literature has grappled with partial identification
of parameters when agents have complete information about the realization of pairwise pref-
erence shocks. However, we show that the equilibrium network in the game with incomplete
information provides the econometrician with sufficiently rich observations to point-identify
all structural parameters. This result suggests that introducing the (more realistic) as-
sumption of incomplete information may transform a model that is fundamentally hard to
identify to a straightforwardly estimable model.
Our work is not the first paper to introduce incomplete information into the above men-
tioned contexts. For instance, in the context of social learning, Acemoglu et al. (2011) and
Lobel and Sadler (2015) allow for randomly generated networks of various kinds. Similarly,
papers such as Leung (2015b) and more recently Ridder and Sheng (2017) study network
formation with incomplete information. Our goal here is primarily pedagogical, strongly
motivated by the data. Specifically, our results are meant to clarify the extent to which a
potentially unrealistic assumption plays a critical role in a wide variety of applications and
how incorporating partial or lack of network knowledge into fairly standard models can lead
to vastly different conclusions.
In addition to the network theory and econometrics literatures discussed above, our paper
is related to works in sociology that explore limits to knowledge about others’ traits as well
as perceptions of friendships in networks (Friedkin, 1983; Krackhardt, 1987, 2014). For
instance, using network data among several departments at the University of Chicago and
Columbia University, Friedkin (1983) showed that a respondent i was less likely to know
about another faculty member j’s current research if the respondent was further from j in
INVESTIGATING NETWORK KNOWLEDGE 4
the network. This is in line with findings of Alatas et al. (2016), who show that subjects
are much less likely to know about the wealth status of individuals in their village who
are further away in the network. Relative to these findings, our paper emphasizes that
knowledge about the network itself is similarly limited and localized through the network.2
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the setting, data, and
sample statistics. Section 3 contains our main empirical findings, where we document how
network knowledge relates to the average distance between the respondents and the pair
of individuals they are being inquired about. In Section 4, we discuss how our findings
regarding limited network knowledge can be relevant for theoretical, applied, and econo-
metric work. Section 5 is a conclusion. All proofs are provided in Appendix A. An online
appendix contains some additional empirical results.
2. Setting and Data
2.1. Network data collection. We collected data in 75 villages in Karnataka, India,
where we have previously worked. The villages span 5 districts around Bangalore where
we have collected network data in the past: Wave I in 2006 (Banerjee et al., 2013) and
Wave II in 2012 (Banerjee et al., 2016). In 2012, we collected network data from 89% of
the over 16,500 households across the 75 villages. These links spanned financial, social, and
informational relationships across 12 dimensions.3 Because such a high share of households
were surveyed and every household could name links to any other household in the census in
each village, we have 98.8% of all links in the resulting undirected, unweighted network. It is
against this backdrop that we conducted a subsequent survey to explore network knowledge.
2.2. Knowledge data collection. We conducted a network knowledge questionnaire in
2015 by asking 4,554 randomly selected individuals across the 75 villages about network
relationships between various other individuals in their community. We asked every respon-
dent i about network relationships among five distinct pairs j and k. This was stratified in
the following way. We ensured that for each i, one jk pair of each distance 1–1.5, distance
2–2.5, distance 3–3.5 distance 4–4.5, and distance 5+ (including unreachables) was selected
in the survey, using our pre-existing network data.4 For each jk pair we asked about the
existence of specific types of network relationships: informational, financial, and social. We
2Krackhardt (1987, 2014) was the first to advocate for collecting data not only about network interactions,
but also about others’ perceptions of such interactions. Krackhardt (1987) called these cognitive social
structures (CSS). Our data could be interpreted as sampling from CSSs in 75 distinct networks.
3(1) whose house the respondent visits, (2) who visits her house, (3) kin, (4) whom they socialize with, (5)
who gives information when there is a medical need, (6) whom they gives advice to, (7) whom they get
advice from, (8) whom they lend material goods to, (9) whom they borrow material goods from, (10) whom
they borrow money from, (11) whom they lend money to, (12) with whom they go to pray (e.g., at a temple
or mosque).
4We also asked i about several demographic traits of j and k. These include if they have children, household
size, main household occupation, monthly income, television ownership, religious details, political disposition,
and land ownership.
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analyze responses to informational, financial, and social relationships, denoted by index r.5
The resulting object is a graph gr for each r.
For every pair jk and relationship type r, we asked i whether gjk,r = 1 or gjk,r = 0.
The respondent could tell us their estimate or tell us that they “Don’t know.” A response
of “Don’t know” could arise for two reasons: either the respondent does not feel certain
enough to offer a guess or because the respondent does not know who either j or k are. The
respondent i’s response is therefore hi,jk,r ∈ {1, 0,Don’t Know}.6
Our outcomes of interest are whether the respondent correctly identified link status, i.e.,
yi,jk,r = 1{hi,jk,r = gjk,r},
and whether they were sure enough to offer a guess to being with, i.e.,
DKi,jk,r = 1{hi,jk,r = Don’t Know}.
We are chiefly interested in how yi,jk,r and DKi,jk,r depend on the network distance between
the respondent i and the pair jk, conditional on the centralities of the nodes involved and
demographic covariates. While we consider the respondents’ outcomes yi,jk,r = 1{hi,jk,r =
gjk,r} for each type of relationship r separately in our regressions, we follow previous work
and measure distances and centralities in the union network g = ∪rgr, according to which
two agents are assumed to be linked if either agent reports having any of the 12 relationship
dimensions with the other.7
2.3. Sample statistics. Respondent characteristics are summarized in Table 1, Panel A.
59% of the respondents were female and the average age in the sample was 42.55. Males
were typically born in the village (51%) whereas most females married in (only 11% were
born in the village). The average degree is 19.5 which indicates a sparse network (the
average number of households in the village is 196). Panel B describe pair characteristics.
99% of the pairs belonged to the same connected component as the respondent (i.e., the
pair was ‘reachable’), and in our stratified sample, 34% of the time they were linked. On
average, the distance from i to jk was 2.13, and 59% of the time they were of the same
caste category. Panel C presents our knowledge survey outcomes. 46% of the time the
respondents expressed that they did not know the linking status of the pairs in question.
When willing to offer a guess, the respondents correctly identified the linking status of the
pair only 20% of the time. Conditional on a link existing, a correct guess was offered 57%
5Specifically, we collapsed some of the Banerjee et al. (2013) survey, leaving us with 3 dimensions: (1) social
interaction; (2) borrowing/lending of money; (3) giving/receiving advice before an important decision;
6Note that even though the subjects report whether or not they believe a given pair of individuals are linked,
we do not observe the respondents’ subjective beliefs (i.e., the probability that i assigns to the existence of
a link j and k).
7This choice is made to generate the regressors as independent variables because we believe that this generates
the most natural definition of social distance for our setting. Individuals might learn about a financial
relationships existing in other parts of the network, for example, through financial ties but also through
information and social ties.
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of the time. This immediately illustrates that respondents systematically overestimated the
existence of a link.8
3. Network Knowledge in the Network
3.1. Knowledge and distance. Our summary statistics in Table 1 already indicate poor
average knowledge about the network. We next explore how the relative position of nodes
influences i’s ability to know whether j and k are linked.
To this end, we run core regressions of the following form:
Yi,jk,r = α+ θgjk,r + λr + βnot ·
(dist (i, j) + dist (i, k)
2
)
· (1− gjk,r)(1)
+ βlink ·
(dist (i, j) + dist (i, k)
2
)
· gjk,r
+ δnot ·Avg. Centralityjk · (1− gjk,r) + δlink ·Avg. Centralityjk · gjk,r
+ γnot · Centralityi · (1− gjk,r) + γlink · Centralityi · gjk,r
+X ′i,jkη + i,jk,r.
Here, Yi,jk,r will either be yi,jk,r, which is a dummy that measures whether i correctly
identified the link status between j and k, or DKi,jk, which is whether i reported not
knowing the status.
Taking for now the case where yi,jk,r is the outcome variable of interest, coefficient θ
measures the difference in the probability of being correct if the link gij,r exists, whereas
coefficients λr are relationship type-fixed effects. Coefficient βnot measures the marginal
change in i’s probability of correctly identifying that j and k are not linked when the
average distance increases by 1, while βlink records how knowledge changes with distance
when gjk,r = 1.9 Similarly, γnot and γlink measure the marginal effect of being one standard
deviation more central on the probability of being correct when the link does not exist,
and that probability when the link does exist. δnot and δlink play the same role but now
looking at j and k’s centralities. Finally, Xi,jk will include a vector of covariates: average
geographic distance of i from j and k, their geographic centralities, and dummies for each
of whether i is of the same caste, subcaste, has the same electrification status, has the
same roof type, and has the same ownership status for each of j and k, as well as all these
variables’ interactions with linked status gjk,r.
8Assuming that each respondent simply offers a response about the existence of a link uniformly at random,
a back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that the implied density of the network by our respondents is at
least 37.9% higher than that in the data.
9Note that even if respondents have biased guesses about whether links exist when they do not truly know
(meaning that their guesses may differ on average from the true rate) this does not affect the test of whether
βnot or βlink is non-zero.
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The main results can be seen in the raw data in Panels A–C of Figure 1. Panel A depicts
the share of correct guesses by average network distance between i and the (j, k) pair. It
is immediate to see that the fraction of correct guesses steadily declines in distance down
to the unreachable pairs. Panel B illustrates that the share of respondents who do not
know jk’s link status increases across network distance. In Panel C, we condition on having
a view on the link status and then look at whether the guess is correct or not. We see
in the raw data that there is a negative correlation between the share of correct guesses
and the network distance, meaning that even beyond having a view on the link, there is
residual information which is more accurate for pairs that are on average socially closer to
the respondents.
We can also consider how network knowledge varies with the centralities of j and k. In
Panels D–F of Figure 1, we plot the same outcomes of interest, varying average centralities.
Here, we see that when j and k are more central, i is more likely to offer a correct guess, is
less likely to say that she “Doesn’t know” the link status, and has better information about
the existence of a link conditional on having a view. Note that more central j and k are
mechanically closer to any arbitrary i, so the relationship between centrality and knowledge
is likely a direct consequence of the relationships in Panels A–C.10
3.1.1. How the likelihood of guessing correctly varies by distance. Table 2 contains our main
network distance results. Panel A looks at how whether i knows jk’s linking status, yi,jk,r
depends on the relative network distances between parties and their centralities. Column 1
presents the regression just with the network position variables, column 2 adds the afore-
mentioned vector of demographic controls contained in Xi,jk, column 3 adds village fixed
effects, while column 4 also includes respondent fixed effects. Note that the specification
with respondent fixed effects holds the demographic and network characteristics of the re-
spondent fixed, comparing close versus far jk, within respondent.11
We focus on column 1 for exposition. We see that having j and k be on the same
connected component as i leads to a 6.5pp increase (p=0.001) in the probability of guessing
the status correctly when there is no link. Further, this corresponds to a 54.7pp increase
(p=0) in the probability of guessing the status correctly when there is a link.
Next, we study how respondents’ knowledge depends on their network distance to the
pair in question. Note that to understand the effect of distance, we need to condition
on reachability through the network, as unreachable individuals have infinite distance to
the respondent. We find that being one step further than j and k on average leads to a
1.8pp decline (p=0) in the probability of guessing correctly when there is no link, and more
importantly a 10.9pp decline (p=0) in the probability of guessing correctly when there is
a link. This is a very large effect relative to the mean (19.9%). Furthermore, columns 2–4
10This finding may also help explain why respondents can identify the more central individuals fairly accu-
rately (Banerjee et al., 2016).
11Online Appendix B presents the same tables with all network covariates.
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illustrate that this pattern is robust to a wide range of specifications, clearly indicating
that the quality of respondent’s information is steeply declining in her network distance
to the pair and is not explained by similarities in demographics such as wealth, caste,
electrification, geography, and so on.12
3.1.2. How the likelihood of being certain varies by distance. Note that the correct guess
outcome in Panel A combines both having a view on a given jk relationship and guessing
correctly about the existence (or not) of that relationship. Panel B of Table 2 focuses on
the first component. The specifications and control sets are the same as in Panel A, but
now our outcome variable is DKi,jk,r, a dummy for whether the respondent declared that
they “Don’t know” whether j and k are linked.
We find that respondents are considerably more likely to have a view about the network
structure local to them and are much more uncertain at larger distances. Once again, we
focus on column 1 for exposition, though the results are largely robust to controls and
fixed effects. Relative to a mean of 46%, we observe that being reachable leads to a 32.1pp
decline (p=0) in the probability of declaring “Don’t know” when gjk,r = 0 and a 46.6pp
decline (p=0) when gjk,r = 1. These large magnitudes suggests that i has extremely limited
knowledge when j and k are unreachable. Then, conditional on reachability, every extra
step leads to a 10.9pp (or 14.8pp) (p=0) increase in the probability of declaring “Don’t
know” when there is no link (when there is a link) which again is a very large effect relative
to the mean.
Next, we further decompose the “Don’t know” response into its two components — not
knowing that either j or k exist and knowing of j and k, but not having a view on their
relationship. We explore this decomposition in Table 3. Columns 1 and 2 consider whether
respondent i knows of both j and k as a function of distance and reachability. Note that
this variable is defined at the (i, j, k) level and does not vary across relationship types. We
therefore collapse the data in columns 1 and 2 to that level. First note that i knows of
both j and k only 64% of the time. This means that approximately three-fourths of the
“Don’t know” responses come from not knowing anything about one or both of the nodes
in question. Unsurprisingly, the patterns of knowledge as a function of reachability and
distance look very similar to those in Table 2, Panel B. In columns 3 and 4, we ask whether
conditional on knowing that j and k exist, there is a residual relationship between DKi,jk,r
and the distance between i and jk. We find that all of the qualitative patterns survive in this
conditional regression: reachability is correlated with a lower likelihood of “Don’t know”,
while larger social distances make a “Don’t know” response more likely. For example, when
12We note that adding controls does reduce the magnitude of the coefficient on reachability when there is a
link. The other three coefficients are stable across specifications.
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gjk,r = 1, moving jk one step further from i is associated with a 4.5pp increase (p=0) in
DKi,jk,r.13
3.1.3. Is there residual information conditional on a degree of certainty? Having established
that the likelihood that a guess is correct and the likelihood of having a view both decline in
distance, we now study whether these results are solely driven by respondents’ uncertainty
(“Don’t know”) or whether within a certainty bin, i’s responses are more accurate when
jk are socially closer. Table 2, Panel C presents the results of regressions that condition
on having a view about the relationship. The control sets across columns are the same as
those used in Panels A and B.
We first note that these regressions condition on individuals i, pairs jk, and relationship
dimensions r for which respondent i claims to know about the relationship status. Given
that we just showed that having a view is also a function of distance, this creates a censoring
problem that could lead to bias in the estimated relationship of interest. We believe that
the most logical form of bias should make it harder to detect a negative relationship between
social distance and bias. This would be the case if i were more likely to have an opinion
about far jk pairs who were nonetheless “closer” on unobservables and if those unobservables
also corresponded to a higher likelihood of a correct guess.
Keeping that caveat in mind, we do find evidence that distance is correlated with making
a correct guess, even conditioning on DKi,jk,r = 0. We again find that being 1 step higher in
terms of average distance to j and k leads to a decrease of between 1.1 and 2.1pp (p=0.005)
in the probability of guessing correctly when there is a link between jk. However, there is
no detectable pattern in distance when gjk,r = 0.
That network distance still predicts accuracy, even conditional on having a view, is
consistent with the idea that simply knowing something about j and k does not drive
the entire relationship identified in Table 2, Panel A. Instead, a systematic bias develops
more strongly outside the local radius.
3.2. What best predicts network knowledge? Our findings thus far illustrate that
network knowledge is systematically predicted by and related to the social distance between
respondent i and the pair jk in question. We also demonstrated that this correlation is not
affected by the inclusion of numerous controls including amenities, caste, geography, village
fixed effects, and respondent fixed effects.
We now ask something stronger: out of all the variables we have at our disposal, what best
predicts network knowledge? For example, it may be geography, because people observe
those who live nearby interacting with others, even if they are not themselves linked. Or
it may be the network itself, because people interact on and through the network, so one
13We note that the regressions in columns 3 and 4 control on an outcome that we have already shown to be
correlated with distance. See Section 3.1.3 below for a discussion of the likely bias.
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is more likely to know about relationships among one’s friends or friends of friends rather
than someone who is an effective stranger.
To this end, we conduct a post-LASSO procedure (Belloni and Chernozhukov (2013)
and Belloni, Chernozhukov, and Hansen (2014b,a)) by regressing the outcome, whether
i knows link jk exists or not (or how certain i is), on the network variables and all the
demographic variables as before. Since this procedure penalizes putting in many parameters
with the aim of selecting a sparse subset of covariates, it may wind up picking a minimal
model that excludes network variables altogether. Alternatively, it may include network-
based variables, viewing them as more predictive than any of our demographic covariates.
Note that since LASSO is a shrinkage estimator, the post-LASSO procedure ensures that
consistent estimates are being used.
Table 4 presents the results of this exercise. Column 1 contains the estimates when the
outcome is whether the respondent’s guess is correct (yi,jk,r). Three core network variables
are selected: the distance to the pair when there is no link, centrality of i when jk are linked,
and the average centrality of the pair jk when they are linked. As we have mentioned before,
the centralities of j and k are highly (negatively) correlated with average distances with
an arbitrary i. Additionally (but omitted from the display), the following demographics
are selected: dummies for whether i and j, i and k, and j and k are of the same caste,
subcaste, have the same occupation, house ownership status, roof type, and electrification
status.14 In column 2 we predict the responses DKi,jk,r of the agent. We find that the
distance is selected both when gjk,r = 0 and gjk,r = 1. Being one step further corresponds
to a 8.99pp (or a 19.6%) (p=0) increase in the probability of declaring “Don’t know”. Two
other network measures are selected here: the centrality of the respondent when gjk,r = 1
and the average centralities of jk when gjk,r = 0. In this case, a smaller set of demographics
is selected: average geographic distance between j and k, and all variables relating to the
castes and subcastes of i, j, and k.15 Note that in either case geographic distance from
respondent to respondees or geographic centralities are not selected.
This suggests that an important set of predictive variables in terms of network knowledge
or certainty about this knowledge consists of distance in the network from the respondent,
how central the respondent is, and how central those in consideration are. These variables
are selected by a post-LASSO procedure in a large horserace against a number of alter-
natives, including geographic variables. This is consistent with a story where people learn
about their social structure by exploring/interacting through their social structure.
1423 village fixed effects and 1 dimension fixed effect are also selected.
15In addition, one occupation variable is selected along with 44 village fixed effects.
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4. Importance of assumptions on network knowledge
In this section, we discuss how our findings regarding limited network knowledge can be
relevant for theoretical, applied, and econometric work. Assuming that agents have complete
information about the underlying network is an oft-used assumption in the literature (with
applications ranging from social learning and peer effects to network formation games). In
what follows, we demonstrate how such an assumption (or lack thereof) can have first-order
implications for a range of qualitative and quantitative results in various contexts.
4.1. Social learning. As our starting point, we explore the implications of network un-
certainty in the context of learning over social networks. Many models of Bayesian social
learning assume that agents have complete knowledge about the social network structure.16
In what follows we use a simple framework to illustrate that relaxing the assumption of full
network knowledge may lead to identification problems that can serve as impediments to
learning, even when agents have access to enough information to uncover the state. Cru-
cially, we also show that these identification problems do not arise when individuals face no
uncertainty about the network.
Consider a collection of n+ 1 individuals, denoted by {0, 1, . . . , n}, who wish to estimate
an unknown state of the world θ ∈ R. Each agent i receives a noisy private signal si = θ+i
about the underlying state, where the error terms i ∼ N (0, σ2) are drawn independently
across agents. Prior to observing their private signals, all agents share an (improper)
uniform prior belief about the state.
In addition to her private signals, each agent observes the point estimates of a subset
of other individuals, whom we refer to as her neighbors. More specifically, we assume
that agents are located on a directed, acyclic network that determines the patterns of
observations: agent i can observe agent j’s point estimate ωj about the state if and only if
there is a directed link from agent j to agent i.17
We represent the potential lack of knowledge about the social network structure by
assuming that agent 0 is ex ante uncertain about the patterns of connections among other
individuals. More specifically, we assume that the underlying network is drawn randomly
from the set G = {g1,g2} with probabilities p1 and p2 = 1− p1, respectively, where
gi = {ij : j 6= 1, 2} ∪ {j0 : j 6= 0}
16This includes both sequential learning models such as Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and
Welch (1992), and Smith and Sørensen (2000) as well as models of repeated network interactions such as
Mossel, Sly, and Tamuz (2015) and Mossel, Olsman, and Tamuz (2016).
17A directed network is said to be acyclic if it contains no directed cycles. The assumption that the network
is acyclic ensures that information flows are unidirectional. This assumption is also equivalent to imposing
an exogenous sequence of timing for agents’ observations and assuming that each agent i can only observe
the point estimates of a subset of her predecessors, as in Banerjee (1992) and Acemoglu, Dahleh, Lobel, and
Ozdaglar (2011), among others.
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and jk denotes the directed edge from agent j to agent k. Thus, whereas in both networks
agent 0 can observe the estimates of all other individuals, agents labeled j = 3, . . . , n can
only observe the estimate of agent i ∈ {1, 2} in network gi. The two networks are depicted
in Figure 2. We have the following result.
Proposition 1. Suppose the social network is drawn randomly prior to the realization of
the signals. As n→∞,
(a) if agent 0 observes the realized network, then she learns the state almost surely;
(b) if agent 0 has misspecified beliefs about the network, she mislearns the state almost
surely;
(c) if agent 0 does not observe the realized network, she remains uncertain about the state
almost surely.
Statement (a) of the above result establishes that regardless of what the realized network
and state are, agent 0 uncovers the true state with arbitrarily high confidence as n → ∞
as long as she has full knowledge about the underlying network. Note that even though
0’s neighbors (partially) rely on a common source of information, agent 0 can use her
knowledge about the network structure to account for any redundancies in her neighbors’
estimates. More specifically, when the realized network is gi, the point estimate of each
agent j ∈ {3, . . . , n} is equal to ωj = (sj + si)/2, while ω1 = s1 and ω2 = s2. Hence, with
access to the point estimates of agents 1 and 2, agent 0 can simply back out agent j’s private
signal sj by computing 2ωj−ωi. Such a calculation enables agent 0 to discern any correlation
in her neighbors’ estimates that is due to their common neighbor i. Consequently, agent
0’s point estimate of the true state is given by
ω0 =
1
n+ 1
s0 + ω1 + ω2 + n∑
j=3
(2ωj − ωi)
 = 1
n+ 1
n∑
j=0
sj ,
which by the law of large numbers, converges to the true state with probability one as
n→∞.
Contrasting the above observation with statements (b) and (c) of Proposition 1 under-
scores the crucial role of correct and complete network knowledge for successful learning in
part (a): whereas agent 0 learns the state with probability one when she observes the real-
ized network, she fails to learn the state if she has either incorrect or incomplete knowledge
about the realized network.
To see the intuition for this contrast, first consider the case in which agent 0 has misspec-
ified beliefs about the social network (statement (b)). More specifically, suppose without
loss of generality that the true realized network is g1, but agent 0 believes (mistakenly)
that the underlying network is g2. Such a misspecification means that even though the
point estimate of agent j ∈ {3, . . . , n} is given by ωj = (sj + s1)/2, agent 0 assumes that
the correlation in her neighbors’ estimates are due to agent 2’s private signal. As a result,
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agent 0’s point estimate is given by
ω0 =
1
n+ 1
s0 + ω1 + ω2 + n∑
j=3
(2ωj − ω2)
 = 1
n+ 1
(n− 2)(s1 − s2) + n∑
j=0
sj
 ,
which converges to θ + s1 − s2 with probability one, whenever the true state is θ. In other
words, agent 0’s misspecified belief about the network structure manifests itself as a bias in
her estimate about the state.
Finally, part (c) of Proposition 1 illustrates that uncertainty about the network structure
can create an identification problem that would serve as an impediment to learning. In the
context of the above example, no matter how many neighbors agent 0 has, she can only
learn the state by properly accounting for the redundancies and patterns of correlations in
her neighbors’ estimates. Yet, uncertainty about the identity of her neighbors’ neighbors
means that agent 0 cannot identify the source of such redundancies. More specifically, when
the true state and the realized network are θ and g1, respectively, agent 0 has no way of
distinguishing whether the underlying state-network pair is (θ,g1) or (θ+ s1− s2,g2), even
as n→∞. This is despite the fact that she can hold and update beliefs not only about the
state but also about the underlying network structure.18
Taken together, Proposition 1 illustrates that incorrect or incomplete knowledge about
the social network can undermine information aggregation, even in fairly simple environ-
ments that would have otherwise led to learning. This observation, alongside our empirical
findings in Section 3, suggests that Bayesian models that allow for uncertainty about the
network structure (such as Lobel and Sadler (2015)) as well as behavioral models (such
as DeGroot (1974), Eyster and Rabin (2014), and Li and Tan (2017)) that assume agents
cannot fully account for how the network structure shapes their observations may be useful
and important starting points for applied work to focus on.
4.2. Network interactions and peer effects. We next focus on network peer effect
games and illustrate how assuming full network knowledge may lead to biased structural
estimates when in fact agents face uncertainty about the underlying network.
To this end, we focus on the canonical network interaction model of Ballester, Calvo´-
Armengol, and Zenou (2006). Besides their widespread use, models that build off this
linear-quadratic framework lend themselves to readily obtainable structural estimates, as
well as counterfactual and policy analyses (such as which “key” players to target with an
intervention). Applications include peer effects in education (Calvo´-Armengol, Patacchini,
and Zenou, 2009), local consumption externalities (Candogan, Bimpikis, and Ozdaglar,
18In this sense, our result on the role of network uncertainty is similar to Acemoglu, Chernozhukov, and
Yildiz (2016), who argue that uncertainty about the signal generating process can result in an identification
problem for a single Bayesian agent in isolation, as the same long-run frequency of signals may be consistent
with multiple states.
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2012), research collaboration among firms (Goyal and Moraga-Gonza´lez, 2001), among nu-
merous others.
The basic setup is an n-player game in which agents’ payoffs are given by
ui(x1, . . . , xn) = xiθi − 12x
2
i + α
∑
j 6=i
gijxixj ,
where xi denotes the action (say, effort) of agent i, gij regulates the strength of strategic
complementarities between i and j, and parameters α ∈ [0, 1) and θi > 0 are common
knowledge among all agents.
As is common in the literature, pairwise interactions can be represented by a directed
and weighted network g = [gij ], with the convention that gii = 0 for all i. In a departure
from the rest of the literature, however, we assume that this interaction network is drawn
randomly prior to the start of the game. More specifically, we assume that for any pair of
agents i 6= j, the weight gij is drawn independently from the rest of the weights according
to a non-degenerate probability distribution with density fij . Throughout, we assume that∑
j 6=i max supp(fij) ≤ 1 for all agents i.19
We consider two variants of the above game. In what we call the complete information
benchmark, we assume that the realized network g is observed by all agents prior to making
their decisions. Therefore, ex post, our complete information benchmark coincides with the
canonical model of Ballester, Calvo´-Armengol, and Zenou (2006). On the other hand,
under the incomplete information variant of the game, we assume that each agent i can
only observe the set of weights {gij : j 6= i} in her neighborhood. Hence, in contrast to the
complete information benchmark, agents choose their actions with no knowledge about the
strength of strategic complementarities among other agents. We have the following result:
Proposition 2. The vectors of equilibrium actions under the complete and incomplete
information variants of the game are given by
xcom = (I − αg)−1θ(2)
xinc =
(
I + αg(I − αE[g])−1
)
θ,(3)
respectively. Furthermore, E[xinci ] < E[xcomi ] for all agents i.
The above result establishes that equilibrium actions are sensitive to whether agents have
full knowledge about the patterns of interactions in the network. More importantly however,
Proposition 2 also illustrates that uncertainty about the network structure results in a
systematic shift in equilibrium actions: each agent’s action in the incomplete information
game is in expectation less than her action in the complete information benchmark.
What this means, practically, is that estimates of θ and α obtained under the assumption
of complete information may be biased if agents are in fact uncertain about the network
19This restriction on the support of the distributions is meant to guarantee that the matrix I − αg is
invertible with probability one.
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structure. Such biases can in turn substantially affect not only counterfactuals but also
policy prescriptions by potentially impacting (i) cost-benefit assessments, (ii) the predicted
extent of externalities, and (iii) the relative network centralities of various agents; a statistic
that is central to policy prescriptions in this literature.
4.3. Identification in network formation games. We conclude this section by inves-
tigating the implications of incomplete network knowledge for identification of structural
parameters in network formation games. As our main result, we show that introducing
the (arguably more realistic) assumption of incomplete information may transform a model
that is fundamentally hard to identify to a straightforwardly estimable model.
Consider a simultaneous-move game of network formation with n players, indexed {1, . . . , n}.
Each agent i is endowed with some attribute zi ∈ {a, b}. These attributes, which are com-
mon knowledge among all agents and are observable to the econometrician, may represent
agents’ gender, caste, race, or other characteristics. Throughout, we use λ to denote the
fraction of agents with attribute a.
Agents draw utilities by forming direct and indirect links with other individuals. More
specifically, the utility function of agent i is given by
ui(g, z, i) =
∑
j 6=i
gij(α− ij) + β
∑
j 6=i
gij1{zj = zi}+ γ
 1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
∑
k 6=i,j
gijgjk
 ,(4)
where g denotes the undirected, unweighted network of linkages (with gij = 1 if i and j are
linked and gij = 0 otherwise), z = (z1, . . . , zn) denotes the vector of population attributes,
and ij is a preference shock that determines agent i’s idiosyncratic cost of establishing a
link to agent j. Throughout, we assume that preference shocks are drawn independently
from a common probability distribution F (·) with a continuous density and full support
over R.
The first two terms on the right-hand side of (4) capture the (net) direct utility of forming
linkages: agent i obtains a net marginal utility of α − ij of forming a direct link to agent
j, with an additional marginal benefit of β if the two agents have identical attributes. On
the other hand, the third term on the right-hand side of (4) allows for the possibility that
indirect connections can also be payoff relevant. For example, when γ > 0, agent i draws a
benefit if any of her neighbors form links with other individuals.20
Players simultaneously announce the set of agents they wish to link to, with links formed
by mutual consent. Formally, each player i chooses the action xij ∈ {0, 1} indicating
20As in Sheng (2016) and Mele (2017), the specification in (4) assumes that the indirect benefits of forming
links are proportional to the number of connections of i’s neighbors. An alternative specification is to assume
that indirect benefits only depend on the number of distinct connections of i’s neighbors, as in de Paula,
Richards-Shubik, and Tamer (2018). Our choice of the specification in (4) is made to simplify the analysis.
However, our main result on the relationship between network knowledge and the identifiability of structural
parameters holds for a broader class of specifications.
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whether she wishes to form a link with agent j. The undirected link (i, j) is then formed if
both parties agree, i.e., gij = xijxji.
The econometrician is interested in estimating the structural parameters α, β, and γ
in (4) while only observing the equilibrium network g. The literature typically assumes
that the realizations of preference shocks ij are common knowledge among the agents
and that agents are in a pairwise stable network (de Paula, Richards-Shubik, and Tamer,
2018; Leung, 2015a; Menzel, 2017; Sheng, 2016). This observability assumption means that
agents’ link formation decisions xij ∈ {0, 1} can be contingent on the realization of all
pairwise preference shocks.
The fact that network formation games of complete information tend to pose a challenge
for identification has been at the forefront of the literature. To overcome this issue, the
literature has resorted to imposing subsequent stronger assumptions on agents’ payoffs, the
number of preference shocks, or the network formation process (see, e.g., de Paula et al.
(2018); Leung (2015a); Menzel (2017); Sheng (2016)).
In a departure from the literature, we assume that preference shocks are only locally
observable: the realization of agent i’s preference shocks i = (i1, . . . , in) are i’s private
information and hence are unobservable to all other agents. Given the incomplete informa-
tion nature of this specification, we focus on (symmetric monotone) Bayes-Nash equilibrium
as our solution concept, according to which each agent i chooses the action xij = 1 if the
realized preference shock ij falls below some given threshold that only depends on i and
j’s attributes.
Before presenting our result, we remark that the notion of incomplete information in
this context is slightly different from those in Subsections 4.1 and 4.2. Whereas our earlier
examples focused on the observability (or lack thereof) of the network structure itself, the
incomplete information variant of the network formation game above requires the agents to
be uncertain about the realizations of the underlying pairwise preference shocks.
Proposition 3. Suppose the econometrician observes the realized network but not the real-
ization of the preference shocks and λ 6= 1/2. If preference shocks are only locally observable,
structural parameters α, β, and γ are point-identified.
The proposition illustrates that relaxing the complete information assumption leads to
a diametrically opposite result of that in the literature: observing the pattern of linkages
provides the analyst with sufficiently rich information to point-identify all structural pa-
rameters. This contrast is driven by the fact that when players have limited information,
they are unable to condition their decisions on the fine details of the entire set of realized
shocks {ij}, leading to coarser linking strategies and hence facilitating identification. This
illustrates that imposing the simple and — in view of our empirical findings in Section 3 —
more realistic assumption of incomplete information transforms a model that is fundamen-
tally hard to identify to a realistic and straightforwardly estimable model, without changing
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the payoffs, imposing specific link formation dynamics, or restricting the number or types
of links that can be formed.
5. Conclusion
We present a new set of stylized facts about the extent to which individuals are informed
about network relationships in their own communities. We collected survey data in 75
communities where we had already documented the full network structure across a number
of dimensions. We find that network knowledge is low and localized: respondents often
do not know linking statuses among others in their village and that network knowledge
decays steeply in network distance to the pair. These patterns are robust to the inclusion of
numerous covariates (e.g., amenities, caste, geography) and are consistent with individuals
learning about the social network through the network itself.
Our findings are at odds with many commonly-used modeling techniques in network eco-
nomics across a range of questions and applications. Moving from a complete information
framework to an incomplete information framework can lead to changes in the behavior of
agents in the models and, thus different predictions or equilibria, thereby affecting qual-
itative conclusions and structural estimates. Further, we show that typical econometric
models of network formation have the features that moving to the more realistic assump-
tion of incomplete information may make parameters identifiable whereas under the less
realistic assumption of complete information, parameters may not be identifiable or only
partially identifiable. We are certainly not the first to explore incomplete information in
any of these cases. However, we view our examples playing a pedagogical role, pointing
out how this ubiquitous assumption in the literature, inconsistent with the data, may affect
widespread conclusions.
Taken together, our empirical and theoretical results suggest that the complete informa-
tion benchmark is not an accurate view of the world for the setting we study, and moreover,
is not always a benign assumption. Rather, incorporating incomplete network information
may yield theoretical predictions that better match the behaviors of agents in real-world
networks. Incomplete information may also play a simplifying role in the theory, both yield-
ing a smaller set of equilibria in games of cooperation and also leading to smaller identified
sets in network econometric models.
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Figure 1. Panels A–C depict raw shares of correct guesses and declaring
that the respondent doesn’t know by distance. Panels D–F show the same
by average centrality of j and k (standardized).
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Figure 2. Networks g1 (left) and g2 (right). Arrows indicate the direction over
which information can flow from one agent to another.
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Tables
Table 1. Sample Statistics
Panel A: Respondent Characteristics
mean obs
Female 0.59 4838
Age 42.55 4838
General or OBC 0.65 4838
Born in the village 0.27 4838
Born in the village (female) 0.11 2854
Born in the village (male) 0.51 1984
Degree 19.51 4838
Eigenvector centrality 0.07 4838
Panel B: Pair Characteristics
mean obs
j,k Reachable 0.99 21861
j,k Linked 0.34 21861
Avg. distance to j,k 2.13 21861
Avg. degree centrality of j,k 18.68 21861
Avg. eigenvector centrality of j,k 0.06 21861
Same caste category j,k 0.59 21834
Same subcaste j,k 0.44 21818
Panel C: Knowledge
mean obs
Correct guess 0.20 66810
Correct guess (j,k not linked) 0.07 43884
Correct guess (j,k linked) 0.57 22926
Don’t know 0.46 66810
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Table 2. Network Knowledge as a function of Distance and Centralities
Panel A: Correct guesses (including don’t knows as wrong guesses)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Correct guess Correct guess Correct guess Correct guess
1{Reachable j,k, Not linked j,k} 0.0647 0.0639 0.0549 0.0420
(0.0196) (0.0192) (0.0194) (0.0224)
[0.001] [0.001] [0.006] [0.065]
1{Reachable j,k, Linked j,k} 0.547 0.147 0.122 0.174
(0.0227) (0.112) (0.108) (0.142)
[0.000] [0.193] [0.261] [0.224]
Avg. distance to j,k, Not linked j,k -0.0177 -0.0153 -0.0115 -0.0133
(0.00398) (0.00389) (0.00400) (0.00437)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.005] [0.003]
Avg. distance to j,k, Linked j,k -0.109 -0.0943 -0.0920 -0.0925
(0.00729) (0.00656) (0.00607) (0.00673)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 66,810 66,810 66,810 66,810
Depvar mean 0.199 0.199 0.199 0.199
Panel B: Don’t knows
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Don’t know Don’t know Don’t know Don’t know
1{Reachable j,k, Not linked j,k} -0.321 -0.271 -0.246 -0.253
(0.0377) (0.0362) (0.0288) (0.0335)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
1{Reachable j,k, Linked j,k} -0.466 -0.355 -0.244 -0.228
(0.0381) (0.153) (0.163) (0.216)
[0.000] [0.023] [0.139] [0.293]
Avg. distance to j,k, Not linked j,k 0.109 0.0933 0.0854 0.0811
(0.00866) (0.00939) (0.00653) (0.00686)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Avg. distance to j,k, Linked j,k 0.148 0.123 0.118 0.122
(0.00873) (0.00788) (0.00784) (0.00887)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 66,810 66,810 66,810 66,810
Depvar mean 0.463 0.463 0.463 0.463
Panel C: Correct guesses (conditional on sure guesses only)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Correct guess Correct guess Correct guess Correct guess
1{Reachable j,k, Not linked j,k} 0.00979 0.0348 0.0327 -0.00996
(0.0432) (0.0424) (0.0368) (0.0484)
[0.821] [0.414] [0.378] [0.837]
1{Reachable j,k, Linked j,k} 0.534 -0.158 -0.101 0.108
(0.0423) (0.108) (0.127) (0.359)
[0.000] [0.148] [0.427] [0.764]
Avg. distance to j,k, Not linked j,k 0.00668 0.00541 0.00857 0.000630
(0.00699) (0.00770) (0.00684) (0.00720)
[0.342] [0.484] [0.214] [0.930]
Avg. distance to j,k, Linked j,k -0.0189 -0.0208 -0.0177 -0.0110
(0.00697) (0.00711) (0.00727) (0.00924)
[0.008] [0.005] [0.017] [0.239]
Observations 35,909 35,909 35,909 35,909
Depvar mean 0.371 0.371 0.371 0.371
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at village level) are reported in parentheses. p-values are re-
ported in brackets. All columns control for eigenvector centrality of i and avg. eigenvector cen-
trality of j,k, when gjk is 1 and 0. All columns also include dimension fixed-effects. Columns (2),
(3) and (4) control for demographic covariates. Demographic controls include average geographic
distance of i from j and k and dummies for each of whether i is of the same caste, subcaste, has
the same electrification status, has the same roof type, has the same number of rooms, and has
the same house ownership status for each of j and k, when gjk is 1 and 0. They also include the
above-mentioned dummies for when j and k have the same demographic traits. Columns (3) and
(4) include village and respondent fixed-effects, respectively.
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Table 3. Network Knowledge, conditional on knowing j,k, as a function of
Distance and Centralities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Know pair Know pair Don’t know Don’t know
1{Reachable j,k, Not linked j,k} 0.337 0.289 -0.0671 -0.0490
(0.0393) (0.0389) (0.0355) (0.0337)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.063] [0.150]
1{Reachable j,k, Linked j,k} 0.446 0.349 -0.122 -0.0548
(0.0395) (0.174) (0.0338) (0.0672)
[0.000] [0.049] [0.001] [0.418]
Avg. distance to j,k, Not linked j,k -0.109 -0.0959 0.0323 0.0229
(0.00923) (0.00975) (0.00736) (0.00728)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002]
Avg. distance to j,k, Linked j,k -0.137 -0.116 0.0447 0.0349
(0.00948) (0.00834) (0.00641) (0.00738)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 22,270 22,270 42,750 42,750
Know pair only X X
Depvar mean 0.640 0.640 0.160 0.160
Number of (i, jk)s 14250 14250
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at village level) are reported in parentheses. p-values
are reported in brackets. All columns control for eigenvector centrality of i and avg.
eigenvector centrality of j,k, when gjk is 1 and 0. Columns (3) and (4) include dimen-
sion fixed-effects. Columns (2) and (4) control for demographic covariates. Demographic
controls include average geographic distance of i from j and k and dummies for each of
whether i is of the same caste, subcaste, has the same electrification status, has the same
roof type, has the same number of rooms, and has the same house ownership status for
each of j and k, when gjk is 1 and 0. They also include the above-mentioned dummies
for when j and k have the same demographic traits.
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Table 4. Post-LASSO Estimates
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Correct guess Don’t know
Avg. distance to j,k, Not linked j,k -0.0269 0.105
(0.00367) (0.00603)
[0.000] [0.000]
Avg. distance to j,k, Linked j,k 0.0899
(0.00554)
[0.000]
Centrality (std.) of i, Linked j,k 0.0134 -0.0125
(0.00582) (0.00560)
[0.024] [0.029]
Avg. centrality (std.) of j,k, Not linked j,k -0.00211
(0.00692)
[0.761]
Avg. centrality (std.) of j,k, Linked j,k 0.0121
(0.00520)
[0.022]
Observations 57,597 63,558
Reachable pairs only X X
LASSO-selected Demographic controls X X
LASSO-selected Village FE X X
Depvar mean 0.204 0.459
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at village level) are reported in paren-
theses. p-values are reported in brackets. Demographic controls include
average geographic distance of i from j and k and dummies for each of
whether i is of the same caste, subcaste, has the same electrification sta-
tus, has the same roof type, has the same number of rooms, and has the
same house ownership status for each of j and k, when gjk is 1 and 0.
They also include the above-mentioned dummies for when j and k have
the same demographic traits. Post-LASSO procedure used with optimal
penalty parameter to select variables.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of part (a). Throughout, let ωn = (ω1, . . . , ωn), where ωi denotes the point estimates
of agent i. Without loss of generality, suppose the true underlying state and the realized
network are θ and g2, respectively. By assumption, the realized network is observable to
agent 0. Consequently, agent 0’s posterior likelihood ratio for an arbitrary pair of states θˆ
and θ˜ given her observations is equal to
f(θˆ|s0, ωn,g2)
f(θ˜|s0, ωn,g2)
= f(s0, ω
n|θˆ,g2)
f(s0, ωn|θ˜,g2)
= f(s0|θˆ)f(ω
n|θˆ,g2)
f(s0|θ˜)f(ωn|θ˜,g2)
,(5)
where we are using the assumption that agents have a common uniform prior beliefs over
the real line and the fact that signal s0 is conditionally independent from the point estimates
of all other agents. On the other hand, since agents j ∈ {3, . . . , n} can observe agent 2’s
point estimate ω2 = s2, it is immediate that ωj = (sj + s2)/2. Therefore, for any arbitrary
state θ˜ ∈ R,
f(ωn|θ˜,g2) = 1(√
2piσ
)n exp
(
− 12σ2
(
(θ˜ − ω1)2 + (θ˜ − ω2)2 +
n∑
i=3
(θ˜ − 2ωi + ω2)2
))
.
The juxtaposition of the above equation with equation (5) therefore implies that agent 0’s
posterior log-likelihood ratio for any given pair of states θˆ and θ˜ is equal to
log f(θˆ|s0, ω
n,g2)
f(θ˜|s0, ωn,g2)
= 12σ2 (θ˜ − θˆ)
(
(n+ 1)(θˆ + θ˜)− 2s0 − 2ω1 − 2ω2 − 2
n∑
i=3
(2ωi − ω2)
)
.
(6)
Set θˆ = θ, where θ is the underlying state of the world. Multiplying both sides of the above
equation by 1/n and taking the limit as n→∞ implies that
lim
n→∞
1
n
log f(θ|s0, ω
n,g2)
f(θ˜|s0, ωn,g2)
= 12σ2 (θ˜ − θ)
2,
where we are using the fact that by the law of large numbers, limn→∞(1/n)
∑n
i=3 ωi =
(ω2 + θ)/2 with probability 1. Therefore, for any θ˜ 6= θ,
lim
n→∞
f(θ|s0, ωn,g2)
f(θ˜|s0, ωn,g2)
=∞
with probability one. Consequently, agent 0 assigns an asymptotic belief of one on the true
state θ as n→∞ almost surely. 
Proof of part (b). Without loss of generality let θ and g1 denote the realized state and
network, respectively. However, suppose that agent 0 has misspecified beliefs about the
network by mistakenly believing that the underlying network is g2. Following an argument
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identical to the proof of part (a), the log-likelihood ratio of agent 0’s posterior beliefs is
given by (6). Consequently, the log-likelihood ratio of agent 0’s posterior beliefs as n→∞
satisfies
lim
n→∞
1
n
log f(θˆ|s0, ω
n,g2)
f(θ˜|s0, ωn,g2)
= 12σ2 (θ˜ − θˆ)(θˆ + θ˜ − 2(θ + ω1 − ω2))(7)
almost surely. In the above expression, we are using the fact that the true underlying
network is g1, and hence, limn→∞(1/n)
∑n
i=3 ωi = (ω1 + θ)/2 with probability one. Setting
θˆ = θ + ω1 − ω2 therefore implies that the right-hand side of (7) is strictly positive for all
θ˜ 6= θ + ω1 − ω2. Consequently,
lim
n→∞
f(θˆ|s0, ωn,g2)
f(θ˜|s0, ωn,g2)
=∞(8)
almost surely for all θ˜ 6= θ + ω1 − ω2. In other words, as n → ∞, agent 0 becomes certain
that the realized state is θ+ω1−ω2; a state that is distinct from the true underlying state
θ with probability one. 
Proof of part (c). Without loss of generality let θ and g1 denote the realized state and
network, respectively, and let θˆ 6= θ. Agent 0’s posterior likelihood ratios are given by
f(θ|s0, ωn)
f(θˆ|s0, ωn)
= P(g
1)f(s0, ωn|θ,g1) + P(g2)f(s0, ωn|θ,g2)
P(g1)f(s0, ωn|θˆ,g1) + P(g2)f(s0, ωn|θˆ,g2)
,
where we are using Bayes’ rule and the assumption that agents have improper uniform prior
beliefs. Consequently,
f(θ|s0, ωn)
f(θˆ|s0, ωn)
≤ P(g
1)f(s0, ωn|θ,g1)
P(g2)f(s0, ωn|θˆ,g2)
+ f(s0, ω
n|θ,g2)
f(s0, ωn|θˆ,g2)
= P(g
1)f(s0|θ)f(ωn|θ,g1)
P(g2)f(s0|θˆ)f(ωn|θˆ,g2)
+ f(θ|s0, ω
n,g2)
f(θˆ|s0, ωn,g2)
.
Let θˆ = θ+ω1−ω2. Equation (8) in the proof of part (b) implies that the last term on the
right-hand side of the above equation converges to zero as n→∞ almost surely whenever
the true state-network pair is (θ,g1). Therefore,
lim sup
n→∞
f(θ|s0, ωn)
f(θˆ|s0, ωn)
≤ P(g
1)
P(g2)
f(s0|θ)
f(s0|θˆ)
lim sup
n→∞
f(ωn|θ,g1)
f(ωn|θˆ,g2) .(9)
On the other hand, note that
log f(ω
n|θ,g1)
f(ωn|θˆ,g2) =
1
2σ2
(
(θˆ − ω1)2 − (θ − ω2)2
)
+ 12σ2
(
(θˆ − ω2)2 − (θ − ω1)2
)
+ 12σ2
n∑
i=3
(
(θˆ − 2ωi + ω2)2 − (θ − 2ωi + ω1)2
)
.
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Since θˆ = θ+ω1−ω2, the first and third terms on the right-hand side of the above equation
is equal to zero. As a result,
log f(ω
n|θ,g1)
f(ωn|θˆ,g2) = 2(ω1 − ω2)(θ − ω2)/σ
2
which is a finite constant that does not depend on n. Hence, the inequality in (9) reduces
to
lim sup
n→∞
f(θ|s0, ωn)
f(θˆ|s0, ωn)
<∞
almost surely. Hence, the belief that agent 0 assigns to the true state θ remains bounded
away from 1. This observation, coupled with the fact that a Bayesian agent never rules out
the true state as impossible implies that agent 0 remains uncertain forever with probability
one. 
Proof of Proposition 2.
We start by analyzing the complete information benchmark. Under complete information
about the realized network, the first-order condition of agent i is given by
xi = θi + α
∑
j 6=i
gijxj .
Therefore, the vector of equilibrium actions in the complete information variant of the
game is equal to xcom = (I − αg)−1θ, thus establishing (2). Note that the assumptions
that ∑j 6=i max supp(fij) ≤ 1 and α < 1 guarantee that (I − αg)−1 always exists and is
element-wise non-negative.
Next, consider the incomplete information game, in which agent i only observes the
realization of the weights in the set {gij : j 6= i}, with no information about gjk for j 6= i.
We establish (3) by verifying that the vector x = (I + αgL)θ satisfies the best-response
equations of all agents simultaneously, where L = (I − αE[g])−1. To this end, recall that
the first-order condition of agent i is given by
xi = θi + α
∑
j 6=i
gijEi[xj ],(10)
where Ei[xj ] is i’s expectation of j’s action conditional on observing her own local neighbor-
hood weights gij . Suppose that the action of each agent j 6= i is given by the conjectured
actions xj = θj + α
∑
k 6=j
∑n
r=1 gjk`krθr. Plugging this expression into the left-hand side of
agent i’s first-order condition in (10) implies that
xi = θi + α
∑
j 6=i
gijθj + α2
∑
j 6=i
∑
k 6=j
n∑
r=1
gijE[gjk]`krθr,
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where we are using the fact that Ei[gjk] = E[gjk]. This is a consequence of the assumption
that the information set of agent i provides no information about gjk when j 6= i. Fur-
thermore, the fact that L = ∑∞m=0 αmEm[g] implies that αE[g]L = L − I. Therefore, it is
immediate that
xi = θi + α
∑
j 6=i
n∑
r=1
gij`jrθr.
Consequently, the strategy profile x = (I + αgL)θ satisfies the first-order conditions of all
agents simultaneously, establishing (3).
We complete the proof of Proposition 2 by establishing that E[xinci ] < E[xcomi ] for all
agents i. As a first observation, note that equation (3) implies the ex ante vector of equi-
librium actions in the incomplete information game is given by E[xinc] = E[I + αg(I −
αE[g])−1]θ. Consequently,
E[xinc] =
∞∑
k=0
αkEk[g]θ.(11)
On the other hand, equation (2) implies that the ex ante vector of equilibrium actions of
actions in the complete information benchmark is given by
E[xcom] = E[(I − αg)−1]θ =
∞∑
k=0
αkE[gk]θ.(12)
The juxtaposition of (11) and (12) implies that the proof is complete once we show that
E[gk] ≥ Ek[g] for all non-negative integers k, with at least one inequality being strict.
We show this by establishing that E[gj1,j2gj2,j3 . . . gjk−1,jk ] ≥ E[gj1,j2 ] . . .E[gjk−1,jk ] for any
sequence of agents j1, j2, . . . , jk and all k.
To prove the this claim, note that if jm = jm+1, then both sides of the above inequality
are equal to zero. Therefore, suppose that the sequence of agents j1, j2, . . . , jk is such that
jm 6= jm+1 throughout. We have,
E[gj1,j2gj2,j3 . . . gjk−1,jk ] = E
 n∏
i=1
∏
l 6=i
∏
r∈B(i,l)
gjr,jr+1
 = n∏
i=1
∏
l 6=i
E
 ∏
r∈B(i,l)
gjr,jr+1

where B(i, l) = {r : jr = i, jr+1 = l} and the second equality is a consequence of the
assumption that all elements of g are drawn independently from one another. Let bil =
|B(i, l)|. We have,
E[gj1,j2gj2,j3 . . . gjk−1,jk ] =
n∏
i=1
∏
l 6=i
E[gbilil ] ≥
n∏
i=1
∏
l 6=i
E[gil]bil ,
where the second implication is a consequence of Jensen’s inequality. Furthermore, note
that the inequality is strict whenever there exists pair of agents i and l in the sequence such
INVESTIGATING NETWORK KNOWLEDGE 29
that bil ≥ 2. As a result,
E[gj1,j2gj2,j3 . . . gjk−1,jk ] ≥
n∏
i=1
∏
l 6=i
∏
r∈B(i,l)
E[gjr,jr+1 ] = E[gj1,j2 ]E[gj2,j3 ] . . .E[gjk−1,jk ].
The above inequality guarantees E[gk] ≥ Ek[g] for all integer k ≥ 0 and hence completes
the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider a monotone symmetric equilibrium of the incomplete
information game, according to which each agent i with attribute zi ∈ {a, b} chooses to link
to an agent j with attribute zj if and only if ij falls below the threshold τzizj . Hence, any
monotone symmetric equilibrium is characterized by four thresholds τaa, τab, τba, and τbb.
As a starting point, we determine the moments of these thresholds that are identifiable
from the observed network g. Recall that the formation of each link requires the mutual
consent of both parties. This means that a link between agents i and j with attributes
zi = zj = a exists if and only if ij , ji ≤ τaa. Consequently,
paa = F 2(τaa),(13)
where paa is the fraction of linkages within type-a agents and F (·) denotes the common
distribution of preference shocks. A similar argument implies that
pbb = F 2(τbb)(14)
pab = F (τab)F (τba),(15)
where pbb and pab denote the fraction of linkages within type-b agents and across agents of
types a and b, respectively.
Next we use the equilibrium conditions to relate the model’s structural parameters α, β,
and γ to the observables. More specifically, note that for τaa to correspond to an equilibrium
threshold, agent i with attribute zi = a must be indifferent between linking to an agent j
with the same attribute whenever ij = τaa. In other words,
τaa = α+ β +
γ
n− 1
∑
k 6=i,j
E[gjk].
Furthermore, note that E[gjk] = F 2(τaa) if zj = zk = a, whereas E[gjk] = F (τab)F (τba) if
zj = a and zk = b. Replacing for these terms from equations (13) and (15) therefore implies
that
F−1(√paa) = α+ β + γ
n− 1
(
(nλ− 2)paa + n(1− λ)pab
)
,(16)
where λ denotes the fraction of agents with attribute a. A similar argument applied to
linkages within type-b agents implies that
F−1(√pbb) = α+ β + γ
n− 1
(
nλpab + (n(1− λ)− 2)pbb
)
.(17)
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Equations (16) and (17) provide the econometrician with two equations that relate network
observables to the structural parameters α, β, and γ and hence can be used for identification.
Specifically, as long as
λ 6= (n− 2)(pbb − pab) + 2(paa − pab)
n(paa + pbb − 2pab) ,(18)
the two equations are linearly independent and hence γ and α+ β are point-identified.
With the above in hand, the next step is to determine conditions under which α and
β are separably identifiable. To this end, note that τab and τba correspond to equilibrium
thresholds if and only if
τab = α+
γ
n− 1
(
(nλ− 1)pab + (n(1− λ)− 1)pbb
)
τba = α+
γ
n− 1
(
(nλ− 1)paa + (n(1− λ)− 1)pab
)
,
where once again we are using equations (13)–(15) to replace for the thresholds in terms of
the observables fractions paa, pab, and pbb. Consequently,
τab = F−1(
√
pbb)− β + γ(pbb − pab)/(n− 1)
τba = F−1(
√
paa)− β + γ(paa − pab)/(n− 1).
Using equation (15) one more time implies that G(β, γ) = pab, where
G(β, γ) = F
(
F−1(√paa)− β + γ paa − pab
n− 1
)
· F
(
F−1(√pbb)− β + γ pbb − pab
n− 1
)
.
Recall that, by assumption, the preference shocks have full support over R, which implies
that F is strictly increasing. This means that G(β, γ) is strictly decreasing over its domain.
This observation, alongside the fact that limβ→∞G(β, γ) = 0 and limβ→−∞G(β, γ) = 1,
implies that for every γ, there exists a unique β such that G(β, γ) = pab. This implying that
β is also point-identified. Since α+ β was already identified, this means that all structural
parameters are point-identified for all values of n.
The proof is complete once we verify that, as n → ∞, the identification requirement on
λ expressed in (18) is always satisfied as long as λ 6= 1/2. To this end, suppose that (18) is
violated, that is,
λ = (n− 2)(pbb − pab) + 2(paa − pab)
n(paa + pbb − 2pab) ,
which reduces to
λ = pbb − pab
paa + pbb − 2pab(19)
as n→∞. Plugging back this expression into equations (16) and (17) implies that (18) is
violated asymptotically only if paa = pbb, which by (19), is equivalent to λ = 1/2. Thus, as
long as λ 6= 1/2, the identification requirement (18) on λ is always satisfied as n→∞. 
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ONLINE APPENDIX
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Appendix B. Main Tables with Centralities Displayed
Table B.1. Network Knowledge as a function of Distance and Centralities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Correct guess Correct guess Correct guess Correct guess
1{Reachable j,k, Not linked j,k} 0.0647 0.0639 0.0549 0.0420
(0.0196) (0.0192) (0.0194) (0.0224)
[0.001] [0.001] [0.006] [0.065]
1{Reachable j,k, Linked j,k} 0.547 0.147 0.122 0.174
(0.0227) (0.112) (0.108) (0.142)
[0.000] [0.193] [0.261] [0.224]
Avg. distance to j,k, Not linked j,k -0.0177 -0.0153 -0.0115 -0.0133
(0.00398) (0.00389) (0.00400) (0.00437)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.005] [0.003]
Avg. distance to j,k, Linked j,k -0.109 -0.0943 -0.0920 -0.0925
(0.00729) (0.00656) (0.00607) (0.00673)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Centrality (std.) of i, Not linked j,k 0.00265 0.00224 0.00325
(0.00285) (0.00286) (0.00280)
[0.356] [0.437] [0.250]
Centrality (std.) of i, Linked j,k 5.61e-05 0.00152 0.00247 -6.32e-06
(0.00521) (0.00520) (0.00510) (0.00588)
[0.991] [0.772] [0.629] [0.999]
Avg. centrality (std.) of j,k, Not linked j,k -0.000971 -0.000282 0.00263 -0.000425
(0.00343) (0.00328) (0.00319) (0.00349)
[0.778] [0.932] [0.412] [0.903]
Avg. centrality (std.) of j,k, Linked j,k -0.00820 -0.00782 -0.00704 -0.00619
(0.00513) (0.00521) (0.00505) (0.00524)
[0.114] [0.138] [0.167] [0.241]
Observations 66,810 66,810 66,810 66,810
Dimension FE X X X X
Village FE X
Respondent FE X
Demographic controls X X X
Depvar mean 0.199 0.199 0.199 0.199
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at village level) are reported in parentheses. p-values are reported in
brackets. Demographic controls include average geographic distance of i from j and k and dummies for
each of whether i is of the same caste, subcaste, has the same electrification status, has the same roof type,
has the same number of rooms, and has the same house ownership status for each of j and k, when gjk is
1 and 0. They also include the above-mentioned dummies for when j and k have the same demographic
traits.
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Table B.2. Don’t Know as a function of Distance and Centralities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Don’t know Don’t know Don’t know Don’t know
1{Reachable j,k, Not linked j,k} -0.321 -0.271 -0.246 -0.253
(0.0377) (0.0362) (0.0288) (0.0335)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
1{Reachable j,k, Linked j,k} -0.466 -0.355 -0.244 -0.228
(0.0381) (0.153) (0.163) (0.216)
[0.000] [0.023] [0.139] [0.293]
Avg. distance to j,k, Not linked j,k 0.109 0.0933 0.0854 0.0811
(0.00866) (0.00939) (0.00653) (0.00686)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Avg. distance to j,k, Linked j,k 0.148 0.123 0.118 0.122
(0.00873) (0.00788) (0.00784) (0.00887)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Centrality (std.) of i, Not linked j,k 0.00201 0.00139 -0.00383
(0.00608) (0.00617) (0.00531)
[0.742] [0.822] [0.472]
Centrality (std.) of i, Linked j,k -0.00335 -0.00565 -0.00979 -0.00396
(0.00595) (0.00587) (0.00571) (0.00649)
[0.574] [0.339] [0.091] [0.543]
Avg. centrality (std.) of j,k, Not linked j,k -0.00535 -0.00438 -0.00927 -0.00413
(0.00761) (0.00740) (0.00675) (0.00641)
[0.484] [0.556] [0.174] [0.522]
Avg. centrality (std.) of j,k, Linked j,k 0.00241 0.00109 0.000736 0.00668
(0.00596) (0.00614) (0.00604) (0.00650)
[0.687] [0.859] [0.903] [0.307]
Observations 66,810 66,810 66,810 66,810
Dimension FE X X X X
Village FE X
Respondent FE X
Demographic controls X X X
Depvar mean 0.463 0.463 0.463 0.463
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at village level) are reported in parentheses. p-values are re-
ported in brackets. Demographic controls include average geographic distance of i from j and k
and dummies for each of whether i is of the same caste, subcaste, has the same electrification sta-
tus, has the same roof type, has the same number of rooms, and has the same house ownership
status for each of j and k, when gjk is 1 and 0. They also include the above-mentioned dummies
for when j and k have the same demographic traits.
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Table B.3. Correct Guess, conditional on sure guesses only, as a function
of distance and centralities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Correct guess Correct guess Correct guess Correct guess
1{Reachable j,k, Not linked j,k} 0.00979 0.0348 0.0327 -0.00996
(0.0432) (0.0424) (0.0368) (0.0484)
[0.821] [0.414] [0.378] [0.837]
1{Reachable j,k, Linked j,k} 0.534 -0.158 -0.101 0.108
(0.0423) (0.108) (0.127) (0.359)
[0.000] [0.148] [0.427] [0.764]
Avg. distance to j,k, Not linked j,k 0.00668 0.00541 0.00857 0.000630
(0.00699) (0.00770) (0.00684) (0.00720)
[0.342] [0.484] [0.214] [0.930]
Avg. distance to j,k, Linked j,k -0.0189 -0.0208 -0.0177 -0.0110
(0.00697) (0.00711) (0.00727) (0.00924)
[0.008] [0.005] [0.017] [0.239]
Centrality (std.) of i, Not linked j,k 0.00605 0.00496 0.00213
(0.00530) (0.00533) (0.00526)
[0.257] [0.355] [0.686]
Centrality (std.) of i, Linked j,k -0.00265 -0.00169 -0.00366 0.00105
(0.00510) (0.00523) (0.00520) (0.00851)
[0.605] [0.747] [0.484] [0.902]
Avg. centrality (std.) of j,k, Not linked j,k -0.00440 -0.00280 -0.00276 -0.00474
(0.00605) (0.00608) (0.00544) (0.00666)
[0.470] [0.647] [0.613] [0.479]
Avg. centrality (std.) of j,k, Linked j,k -0.00999 -0.0111 -0.0103 -0.00679
(0.00587) (0.00603) (0.00631) (0.00768)
[0.093] [0.070] [0.105] [0.379]
Observations 35,909 35,909 35,909 35,909
Sure guess only X X X X
Dimension FE X X X X
Village FE X
Respondent FE X
Demographic controls X X X
Depvar mean 0.371 0.371 0.371 0.371
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at village level) are reported in parentheses. p-values are reported in
brackets. Demographic controls include average geographic distance of i from j and k and dummies for
each of whether i is of the same caste, subcaste, has the same electrification status, has the same roof type,
has the same number of rooms, and has the same house ownership status for each of j and k, when gjk is
1 and 0. They also include the above-mentioned dummies for when j and k have the same demographic
traits.
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Table B.4. Network Knowledge, conditional on knowing j,k, as a function
of Distance and Centralities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Know pair Know pair Don’t know Don’t know
1{Reachable j,k, Not linked j,k} 0.337 0.289 -0.0671 -0.0490
(0.0393) (0.0389) (0.0355) (0.0337)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.063] [0.150]
1{Reachable j,k, Linked j,k} 0.446 0.349 -0.122 -0.0548
(0.0395) (0.174) (0.0338) (0.0672)
[0.000] [0.049] [0.001] [0.418]
Avg. distance to j,k, Not linked j,k -0.109 -0.0959 0.0323 0.0229
(0.00923) (0.00975) (0.00736) (0.00728)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002]
Avg. distance to j,k, Linked j,k -0.137 -0.116 0.0447 0.0349
(0.00948) (0.00834) (0.00641) (0.00738)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Centrality (std.) of i, Not linked j,k 0.000393 0.000918 0.00344 0.00270
(0.00531) (0.00544) (0.00490) (0.00482)
[0.941] [0.866] [0.485] [0.577]
Centrality (std.) of i, Linked j,k 0.00944 0.0102 0.00644 0.00424
(0.00577) (0.00565) (0.00521) (0.00523)
[0.106] [0.074] [0.220] [0.420]
Avg. centrality (std.) of j,k, Not linked j,k 0.00927 0.00697 0.00272 0.000500
(0.00784) (0.00758) (0.00653) (0.00663)
[0.241] [0.361] [0.679] [0.940]
Avg. centrality (std.) of j,k, Linked j,k -0.00227 -0.00296 -0.000628 -0.00357
(0.00602) (0.00602) (0.00369) (0.00404)
[0.707] [0.625] [0.865] [0.380]
Observations 22,270 22,270 42,750 42,750
Know pair only X X
Dimension FE N/A N/A X X
Demographic controls X X
Depvar mean 0.640 0.640 0.160 0.160
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at village level) are reported in parentheses. p-values are re-
ported in brackets. Demographic controls include average geographic distance of i from j and
k and dummies for each of whether i is of the same caste, subcaste, has the same electrification
status, has the same roof type, has the same number of rooms, and has the same house own-
ership status for each of j and k, when gjk is 1 and 0. They also include the above-mentioned
dummies for when j and k have the same demographic traits.
